Ansell and Gash (2008) argue that incentives of stakeholders to participate in collaborative governance hinge upon power (and resource) balance and certain level of trust among participants as initial background conditions at the outset of collaborative governance (See Fig. 1). Power of stakeholders manifests in terms of status, organizational infrastructure for representation (English, 2000), financial or human resources with government, skills and expertise of the local people to engage in discussions about highly technical problem, and the time, energy, or liberty to engage in time-intensive collaborative processes (Yaffee & Wondolleck, 2003). Power imbalance, or the prehistory of antagonism among stakeholders is likely to express itself in the form of distrust, strategies of manipulation, and dishonest communications, and lessening the incentive to participate (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Schuckman, 2001; Warner, 2006). Thus, they posit that strategies of empowerment and representation of weaker stakeholders or/and steps to remediate the low levels of trust among the stakeholders should be taken to initiate collaborative governance effectively (Ansell & Gash, 2008).

Also, the incentive to participate in collaborative governance depends partly upon expectations of stakeholders about concrete, tangible, effectual policy outcomes or benefits against the balance of time and energy that collaboration requires (Brown, 2002; IUCN, 2012; Naidoo et al., 2011) and lack of alternative means through which stakeholders can achieve their interests unilaterally (W. B. Adams, 2013; Balint & Mashinya, 2006; Bouwen & Taillieu, 2004). Thus, four factors may interplay to affect the incentives to participate in collaborative governance in general: interdependence of stakeholders, power imbalance, prehistory of antagonism (level of distrust) and potential tangible benefits.

When it comes to conservation of wildlife through CBTH in developing countries, those four background factors may also work to affect the incentives to participate in CBTH. For CBTH to be considered by government as an alternative mechanism to conventional top-down, command-and-control conservation policy and proposed to local communities, interdependence between government and local communities should exit. In other words, government may have an incentive to capitalize on energy, ideal, and effort of local communities to conserve endangered wildlife and propose CBTH to local communities in the first place. Such incentive might come from the realization that previous government policies have failed to achieve conservation of wildlife, often with the help or advice of international conservation organizations (Khan, 2012).

Failure of community-based conservation programs in many cases often has something to do with the third factor, the prehistory of conflict between strong governments and relatively weak local communities that may limit participation in collaboration in general. Conventional conservation policies, such as establishing national parks as protected areas, often lead to conflicts between government and local communities by restricting local communities from using natural resources including wildlife in protected areas and even displacing them forcibly out of the protected areas (Biggs et al., 2017; Frost & Bond, 2008; Mombeshora & Le Bel, 2009; Ribot, 2002).

Economically poor local communities who live on subsistence agriculture in their traditional lands perceive wildlife mainly as a threat to their livelihoods (Dickman, 2010). For example, in Uganda, stampedes of active wildlife animals on farmlands at the edge of the Kibale National Park reduced crop production dramatically (Naughton-Treves, 1997). Thus, they tend to poach wild animals illegally and harm their habitats for their survival and are often tempted to illegal wild animals trafficking for economic reason, which have limited the effectiveness of conservation policy (Jachmann, 2008; Treves & Karanth, 2003). In Mozambique, the colonial rules prevented local communities in reserved forests from using natural resources, consequently local communities were united against the government and consumed all the local forest resources (Virtanen, 2005).

Despite the uncertainty of effectiveness of community-based conservation from the beginning, government cannot but rely upon bottom-up approach that utilize the effort of local communities in conserving wildlife instead of ineffective command-and-control policies. In Pakistan’s mountain regions of Karakoram, Hindukush and the Himalayas, protected Areas, usually established by the state, created conflicts with local livelihoods (Khan, 2012; Shackleton, 2001; Virk et al., 2003). Similarly, in Namibia, after the establishment of protected areas, Herero communities were disconnected from their lands and associated resources (A. F. Hoole, 2010).

Taking these dynamics into consideration, the first contingency proposition is proposed as follows:

• (1)

  If government realizes the failure of conventional conservation policies, then it is more likely to consider and propose CBTH to local communities.

The dependency of local communities on CBTH may come from power imbalances between strong government and weak local communities who neighbor or live closely with wildlife animals (Bouwen & Taillieu, 2004; Seixas & Berkes, 2010; Twyman, 2000). Considering economic survival and rights to use natural resources independently as the main interests of economically poor and politically weak local communities, the expectations to reap tangible benefits from collaboration in CBTH may affect strongly the incentive to participate in collaboration.

CBTH programs are based on the premise of financial incentives from regulated hunting of wildlife for local communities who are committed to conserve those animals (W. M. Adams & Hulme, 2001; Mayaka et al., 2005; Taylor, 2009; Virk et al., 2003; Wijnstekers, 2011). The expectations of direct benefits such as hunting and indirect benefits such as ecotourism for the local people can make them interested in being engaged in CBTH programs. Studies have shown high motivation and interest in participation in community-based conservation programs in general where potential for these incentives is relatively high (Frost & Bond, 2008; IUCN, 2012; Khan, 2012). CBTH is likely to be more attractive to local communities who live in remote and inaccessible or politically unstable areas where alternative ways to make revenue, such as photographic ecotourism, may not be viable. According to Lindsey et al. (2007), trophy hunting has several advantages over photographic tourism in areas where infrastructure is not available, weather is not friendly for large public to visit, or high density of viewable wildlife is not available. Also, hunting industry is relatively more resilient to political instability than usual tourism (Damm, 2008).

Thus, the second contingency proposition is:

• (2)

  Despite the prehistory of conflicts and power imbalance as usual background conditions in many developing countries, if local communities perceive the possibility to acquire necessary rights to manage their natural resources as well as potential economic benefits from trophy hunting, they are more likely to come to the table for collaboration with the government.

One interesting case that may test the first and second propositions is observed in Zimbabwe (Baker, 1997). When the establishment of ‘Gonarezhou National Park’ had evicted the local community called “the Shangaan” from their traditional lands in the 1960s did not bear fruit of conserving wildlife, the government suggested community-based conservation that would give the Shangaan people responsibility for wildlife conservation in their areas. However, the Shangaan community did not collaborate with the government’s proposal due to lack of trust on the government and hence increased poaching in and around the park. In the early 1980s, the Shangaan agreed to work with government on the condition that the community would have the authority to manage wildlife in their areas and they would derive economic returns from safari hunting. Since the community started selling the right to kill two elephants for 3,000 USD over a 5 years period, the community could build a school, a grinding mill, and a clinic with the revenues from regulated hunting. With the tangible economic benefits from Safari hunting, the community’s attitude towards wildlife animals changed dramatically enough to protect them as a valuable community asset (Andrade & Rhodes, 2012; Balint & Mashinya, 2006). Also, in Northern Pakistan, local communities who experienced conflicts with the government due to protected area policy, later participated in CBTH with their expectation of potential economic incentives (80% of the hunting revenues) from trophy hunting (Khan, 2012).

However, mere participation of local communities in initiating CBTH does not always guarantee successful outcomes in the end. Sneaky and pervasive power imbalances or lack of trust due to previous conflicts may lurk and prevent collaboration even after stakeholders start CBTH. Thus, one needs to understand how internal process of CBTH deals with those problems of power imbalance, lack of trust, and poor governance. For example, in Kilosa district in Tanzania where two groups of communities experienced conflicts in competition for scarce resources, the government established Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs) in 1998 aimed at wildlife conservation and rural development at the same time. Although local community representatives actively participated in decision-making process from the beginning, however, during the implementation, conflicts occurred and were intensified further that caused the projects to fail in the end (Nilsen, 2009).

In order for successful collaboration from the start of negotiation to structure process to the achievement of ultimate outcome, there should be actors with leadership ability of bringing broad range stakeholders to one platform, engaging them with collaborative spirit, setting clear ground rules, building trust, facilitating dialogue, exploring creative solutions for common goals, maintaining technical credibility, empowering weaker stakeholders, and ensuring the integrity of collaborative process (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Bunge-Vivier & Martínez-Ballesté, 2017; Lasker et al., 2001; Yaffee & Wondolleck, 2003). In those contexts where power imbalances exist among stakeholders who distrust each other, leadership becomes more critical (Ansell & Gash, 2008). Also, scholars overwhelmingly argue that leadership should be facilitative rather than authoritative (Bouwen & Taillieu, 2004; Kaner, 2014; Nalbandian, 1999; Ozawa, 1993). Ansell and Gash (2008) propose that the types of facilitative leader may hinge upon the context of power distribution and incentive to participate. The third-party actors whom stakeholders acknowledge and trust, may provide neutral and facilitative services in high-conflict and low-trust situations, where power is balanced with stakeholders’ willingness to participate. However, contexts where power imbalances exist or incentives to participate are weak may require strong “organic” leaders who may belong to community and can gain trust of various stakeholders at the start of the negotiation process. Thus, availability of such organic leaders might seriously limit the effectiveness of collaborative process (Ansell & Gash, 2008).

Literature on community-based conservation also finds facilitative leadership crucial for the success of CBTH programs (Bunge-Vivier & Martínez-Ballesté, 2017; German & Keeler, 2009; Jachmann, 2008; Paudyal et al., 2017; Shackleton, 2001). Considering the general context of endangered species management in developing countries, such as prehistory of conflict and lack of trust, and building upon the second proposition in the previous section, facilitative third party actors, such as local and international conservation NGOs may be very helpful even in the presence of power imbalance.

For CBTH to be initiated, there should be some actors who can help stakeholders to link social involvement and development with conservation objectives. Local, or international conservation NGOs can be instrumental in orchestrating relevant actors to buy that idea (Cash & Moser, 2000; Folke et al., 2005). For example, in Namibia, Garth Owen-Smith and Margaret Jacobsohn as leaders pioneered the community-based conservation program called ‘the Integrated Rural Development and Nature Conservation (IRDNC)’ where they worked with local community, called ‘Herero,’ in order to link social and economic development to the conservation of region’s wildlife and other natural resources (A. F. Hoole, 2010). The program was quite successful in controlling rampant illegal hunting of black rhinos and elephants and increasing most wild species with major contributions from community-appointed game guards in the northeast of Namibia (Roe et al., 2000). IRDNC’s leadership was facilitative in fact-finding by engaging the Namibian government in conducting community surveys and setting up community game guard program. In Belize, a leader of NGO was instrumental in creating the Port Honduras Marine Reserve by persuading the Belize Government and surrounding communities to adopt the Reserve and by linking international concerns on marine ecosystems with local economic needs (Fernandes, 2005; Seixas & Berkes, 2010). Also, in the Guyana’s Community-based Arapaima Conservation, a local NGO played a role in finding funding for the project, establishing links between local community and government authorities, and building their capacities (Fernandes, 2004). Also, International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) played critical roles as a facilitator for conservation program in Northern Pakistan in educating local people, providing technical training for community wildlife guards and government field officers, creating an environment for mutual trust and commitment between the government agencies and community, and safeguarding the whole process (Khan, 2012; Mir, 2006; Zafar et al., 2014).

Leadership may come from community side (Folke et al., 2005; A. F. Hoole, 2010; McIntosh & Renard, 2010) as well as government side (Balint & Mashinya, 2006). Once a community decides to participate in CBNRM or CBTH, ‘organic’ leadership of community representative becomes very important in informing community members about potential economic benefits from their own conservation efforts, and sharing their own knowledge with government and international organizations (Bunge-Vivier & Martínez-Ballesté, 2017; Folke et al., 2005; Seixas & Berkes, 2010). In CBTH, community leaders may lead the process of surveying wildlife, deciding on quotas, monitoring illegal activities and poaching, and imposing penalties on community members who violate the rules (Taylor, 2009). Leadership roles of government officials in CBTH and CBNRM are also important in showing stable and transparent commitment during collaboration process since abrupt change in government leadership often leads to the failure of the project. For example, in the CAMPFIRE program in Zimbabwe, community members lost their trust in the government after change of leadership in the government designated committee caused malpractices in the distribution of revenues of trophy hunting (Balint & Mashinya, 2006).

In view of the evidence of factors of facilitative leadership affecting CBTH, the third and fourth contingency propositions are formulated as bellows:

• (3)

  Even if there is a prehistory of conflict, lack of trust, and power imbalance between community and government, facilitative third parties, such as local or international conservation NGOs can play critical roles in initiating and maintaining CBTH.

• (4)

  If “organic” leadership from community is instrumental in implementing conservation efforts as CBTH programs indicate, and government leadership provides stable and transparent commitments during the process, CBTH will be more likely to succeed.

Institutional design in the model of collaborative governance refers to the basic protocols and ground rules for collaboration that are designed to secure the procedural legitimacy of the collaborative process (Ansell & Gash, 2008). Literature on community-based conservation programs suggests several design features for successful collaboration that include open and inclusive representation of important stakeholders (Bouwen & Taillieu, 2004; Mayaka et al., 2005; Newig & Fritsch, 2009), clear ground rules (Usongo & Nkanje, 2004), process transparency (Brunet & Aubry, 2016; Dudley, 2008), clear definition of roles (Baldus, 2009; Taylor, 2009), formalization of governance structures (Di Minin et al., 2016; Hayes, 2006), consensus-oriented decision-making and the use of realistic deadlines (W. B. Adams, 2013; Ansell & Gash, 2008). Exclusion of important stakeholders undermines the legitimacy of collaborative outcomes (Ansell & Gash, 2008). Clear ground rules work to reassure stakeholders, who may have skeptical frame of mind and be sensitive to issues of equity and power imbalance, that process is fair, open, and transparent. Formal acknowledgment of transparent governance structure helps stakeholders to feel confident that the public negotiation is real rather than window dressing.

For sustainable management of common pool resources, Ostrom (2008) suggests critical principles of a governing institution that resemble some of the institutional design of collaborative governance. For example, the governing institution should define clear group boundaries, ensure that community gets the right to participate in rulemaking, and make sure that community has the right to modify these rules in case they affect the interests of local community (Ostrom, 2008; Schumann, 2001). Identification of the affected community in local natural resource management is often made on the criteria of geographical proximity to the resource (B. Adams, 2008; Lebel et al., 2008). However, the number and the scope of stakeholders in wildlife conservation are often larger since some wild animals’ habitats go beyond conserved areas (Child, 2013; Pietersen, 2011). Thus, representation of stakeholders in collaborative governance in wildlife conservation, such as CBTH, needs to be flexible and adaptable enough to accommodate both complex and diverse stakeholder interests.

The success of community-based conservation initiatives highly depends on the nature(inclusiveness) of the basic rules and protocols that provide procedural legitimacy and govern the whole process smoothly (Aheto et al., 2016; Baker, 1997; Bunge-Vivier & Martínez-Ballesté, 2017; Chabwela & Haller, 2010; IUCN, 2012; Khan, 2012; Nagendra & Ostrom, 2012; NASCO, 2010; Newig & Fritsch, 2009; Ostrom, 2009). These basic rules and protocols are collectively referred to institutional designs that allow (or obstruct) the inclusion of certain members of community through certain rules.

An inclusive institutional design ensures the opportunity for each stakeholder to deliberate with others about setting objectives for achieving policy outcomes through consensus (A. Hoole & Berkes, 2010; Mir, 2006; Shackleton, 2001). In such deliberative designs, there are more chances that indigenous knowledge and skills are incorporated which increases shared understanding of each stakeholder on the common good use (Natcher & Hickey, 2002; Redpath et al., 2013; Seixas & Berkes, 2010). Also, non-inclusive representation of one or many stakeholders might lead to vicious cycle by increasing the power imbalance and knowledge gap (Aheto et al., 2016). Hence, an inclusive institutional design should fulfill at least two important requirements. First, it must allow local people to possess property rights of resource use; secondly, it should enable local people to construct local level institutions that control the use of the resource, distribution of benefits and redressal of complaints arising during the use of the resources etc. In a study of five forests in Uganda, Banana and Gombya-Ssembajjwe (2000) find the condition of forests better in areas where property rights are well known and enforced than in those areas where national laws lack enforcement.

We thus argue that if explicit rules are in place which guide the roles and responsibilities of each stakeholder in a way that is inclusive and does not discriminate (or exclude) one stakeholder, then participatory process of the CBTH will be more sustainable in terms of participation and outcomes.

We thus present the following proposition:

• (5)

  If the existing institutional structure allows the creation of ground rules and basic protocols for collaboration that is inclusive and open to change, the CBTH is likely to be sustainable.

Existence of clearly defined laws, regulations and procedures developed with local community inputs and which are periodically reviewed and updated, can influence the success of CBTH programs. The key principles for successful CBTH programs as suggested by IUCN include a transparent government framework characterized by clear allocation of responsibilities, accounting for revenues in a transparent manner and distribution as per agreements, taking steps to eliminate corruption and ensuring compliance with all national and international requirements and regulations by relevant bodies such as administrators, regulators and hunters (IUCN, 2012). A case study by Gibson and Becker (2000) reflects a strong local community in Western Ecuador which failed to protect its forest and wild animals from illegal hunting despite the positive valuation of the tropical forests and secured property rights and a rich history of (other) micro-institutions. The same study finds that rules have had a direct impact on the condition of forest degradation and its related resources such as wildlife.

Whether CBTH programs result into successful outcomes depends on the way in which conflicts and deadlocks among the stakeholders are resolved. We find a considerable number of cases where conflicting opinions have reduced commitment and hindered the implementation of community-based conservation programs (Nagendra & Ostrom, 2012; Redpath et al., 2013; Schumann, 2001; Taylor, 2009). A detailed study enlisting numerous failure cases by Chabwela and Haller (2010) indicates that conflicts between authorities and the local people over wildlife resource use have exacerbated the differences and resulted into failure. Studies also show a strong influence of economic incentives on conflict resolution in community-based conservation programs. In Northern Pakistan, where perceived inadequate opportunities for income generation was observed as a main reason for lack of participation in environmental protection, local people were ready to conserve environment on the condition of incentives provision

(Imran et al., 2014)

All collaborative governance types require face-to-face dialogue among stakeholders. However, Ansell and Gash (2008) argue that face-to-face dialogue itself does not always lead to collaboration. It can reinforce stereotypes or increase antagonism. In most of the community-based conservation programs, face-to-face communication and dialogue between the local people, government authorities and the private partners plays significantly important role, however, it does not necessarily guarantee successful conservation outcomes (Balint & Mashinya, 2006; Bunge-Vivier & Martínez-Ballesté, 2017; Chabwela & Haller, 2010; Damm, 2008; Frost & Bond, 2008; German & Keeler, 2009; Lindsey et al., 2007; Newig & Fritsch, 2009; Ostrom, 2008). Since differences of opinions and perception about the ways in which conservation and development strategies are formulated and adopted exist in common pool related problem, sitting together around one table increases the chances of consensus (Khan, 2012). Although not sufficient condition, face-to-face dialogue improves better communication and decision-making environment between government authorities, local community representatives in contexts where the prehistory is dominated by conflicts (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Ostrom, 2008). According to Frost and Bond (2008), participation and the sense of ownership of marginal groups within community was highly enhanced when face-to-face dialogue and discussions held at multiple decision-making occasions. Not only mere participation, studies also show discussion with local people and their representatives helps build confidence and skills which are critical for the success of the negotiation process. However, the success of such discussion again depends on the available leadership as well as commitment to the process which are equally important for the collaborative process.

The decline of a promising CBNRM in Mahenye, Zimbabwe reflects huge gap in direct communication between the local people and the committee chiefs who were undemocratically imposed on them (Balint & Mashinya, 2006). This gap consequently resulted into the breaking of participatory system which was crucial for the success of conservation program. Another study on participatory collective action in the Kafue Flats, Zambia shows the local institutions regulating the common good were strengthened through discussion among local stakeholders (Chabwela & Haller, 2010). The basic idea of such discussion is to empower those who perceive limited role in decision making despite having differences of opinion about the mechanism.

While, literature on failed community conservation projects frequently attributes lack of communication as the main factor that reduces confidence, successful projects clearly indicate the role of open dialogue and communication (Balint & Mashinya, 2006; Chabwela & Haller, 2010). For example, despite local people were not even aware of their rights, and had little confidence in the government, sitting around the same table with district authorities highly contributed in overcoming the communication barrier between the government and local people in Northern Pakistan (Khan, 2012).

As an important step towards sustainable collaboration, we present the following proposition:

• (6)

  Coupled with other parallel measures, such as government service delivery and economic incentives etc., face-to-face meetings of the local community representatives with government officials or private partner will positively influence the performance of CBTH.

The degree of stakeholders’ commitment to the collaborative process can influence the CBTH through mutual recognition and joint appreciation. In many cases in developing countries, CBTH or CBNRM starts with the funding from international organizations through a formal proposal. In some cases, such as the Northern Pakistan, the role of local people in formulating the contents of CBTH from the beginning is limited due to requirement of funding proposals. Despite such limitations, local people might still agree on some bounded objects of negotiation. These include commitment of delivery of revenues (or benefits) from trophy hunting to the community welfare, participation in the implementation mechanism specially when there is employment opportunities, and government capacity and performance.

In Northern Pakistan case, the IUCN and Agha Khan Rural Support Program (AKRSP) suggested to the government the feasibility of a community-based natural resource management. Later, after the proposal for project funding submitted by IUCN to Global Environmental Facility (GEF) through United Nations Development Program (UNDP) got accepted, the local people were invited to the negotiation process where they cooperated in designing the ground rules for setting up objectives of collaboration (GEF, 2006). Analysis of the project documents reveals a well-designed framework that gives more control to local people and empower their capacity to conserve natural resource, while equally showing strong commitment on the continuity of the project. Other studies point to the weak commitment by the central government agencies in continuing the CBTH process as a problem (Balint & Mashinya, 2006).

Commitment however depends on existing trust among stakeholders and transparency in procedures that establish the integrity for negotiation. Initiatives that seek increasing involvement of local communities can create a sense of commitment and ownership among local people that in turn overcome any power imbalances or differences of perceptions (Andrade & Rhodes, 2012). Ansell and Gash (2008) argue that despite a collaborative governance is mandated, lack of incentive to participate might be translated as lack of real commitment on the part of stakeholders. In the context of CBTH, several studies consider sustained commitment among stakeholders towards effective implementation of conservation plans as an important part of the collaborative process (W. B. Adams, 2013; Frost & Bond, 2008; Nagendra & Ostrom, 2012; Wijnstekers, 2011). Our analysis of relevant CBTH cases suggest that community’s belief about government commitments to ensure equitable implementation always matter. For example, in one case, two-third of those who knew that the government has passed a new land law, doubted the government’s commitment in ensuring its equitable implementation (Soto et al., 2001). Although the consensus-oriented governance greatly reduces the risks so that stakeholders can make more commitment, the CBTH still needs willingness to accept the outcomes of deliberation, even if they do not go in line with stakeholder’s full interest.

• (7)

  A strong commitment demonstrated by stakeholders specially governments and NGOs can win the cooperation of local community despite any limitation during the initiation of the CBTH.

We note multiple cases of CBTH programs where uncertain behavior of government authorities and lack of decision making capacity related to community based conservation influence the morale of community participation that ultimately lead to failure in conservation (Balint & Mashinya, 2006; German & Keeler, 2009; A. F. Hoole, 2010; Khan, 2012). For example, one conservation study highlights lack of clarity on key decisions among local officials which resulted into severe limits on benefits to local communities and effectively lessened their role in governance (A. Hoole & Berkes, 2010). In a case study of Central Karakoram National Park Pakistan, one view is quoted as: “We are ready to manage the pastures to conserve them but we wouldn’t like the government to tell us that we have no use rights in the Park” (Imran et al., 2014)[P.296]. CBTH does not necessarily means that the community has been given full decision-making power. For example, some community members still perceive that decision-making powers (other than fund distribution) lie with government-controlled departments. CBTH programs have been frequently halted due to situations where government agency does not have the capacity (e.g knowledge, training etc), organization(e.g. skilled human resource), status(e.g. legislation), or resources to participate(e.g to initially finance the project), or to participate on an equal footing with other stakeholders (Bunge-Vivier & Martínez-Ballesté, 2017; Folke et al., 2005).

Ansell and Gash (2008) argue that shared understanding about collective achievement is crated at some point during collaboration. This might happen in some CBTH cases, where community is engaged from the beginning. However, in general, CBTH programs vary in the level of understanding between community and government or NGOs. Initially, local community perceives the outcome of collaboration as economic incentive and livelihood given the socio-economic conditions of the society and their attachment to natural resource. At the same time, intervening organization or governments’ aims differ as their primary objective is environmental conservation. A recent study undertaken in Central Karakoram National Park, Pakistan by Imran et al. (2014) examined the differences in opinions about environmental objectives among four stakeholders associated with protected area. The study finds opinions of the stakeholders towards environmental objectives closely linked to their incentives. This indicates that despite differences in opinions, local community might develop understanding with government and international organizations if they agree on collective actions that embody incentives for local community. Several factors might influence local community perception about the natural resource conservation. These include, the history of conservation in the area, awareness of community about environmental concerns and benefits to the local community (Ormsby & Kaplin, 2005). Moreover, effective communication among stakeholders may help in developing shared understanding among stakeholders.

Concrete, intermediate, “small wins” from collaboration represent not only tangible outputs, but also critical process outcomes that can feed back into a virtuous collaborative circle of trust building and commitment (Ansell & Gash, 2008). Intermediate outcomes may not be helpful for trust building where stakeholders have more ambitious goals that cannot easily be parsed into small wins (Vangen & Huxham, 2003). Ansell and Gash (2008) even posit that a collaborative path should not be pursued by stakeholders when prior antagonism between stakeholders is high that requires long-term commitment to trust building and small wins are not expected. Intermediate outcomes in CBTH cases include local-level development or conservation plans or spending of initial external funding on conservation related expenditures (Bunge-Vivier & Martínez-Ballesté, 2017; Shackleton, 2001; Wijnstekers, 2011). Continuity in these small wins are crucial for long term sustainability of the CBTH process. For example, in Northern Pakistan, the community as well as government anticipated intermediate wins, such as the successful distribution of trophy revenue through village development plan and establishment of local monitoring team which looked after the animals (Khan, 2012). This crucially increased the long-term commitment and cooperation among stakeholders. Despite conservation being main objective of IUCN, showing positive performance on small wins was necessary for long term success.

We thus suggest that:

• (8)

  Intermediate outcomes that create short-term tangible gains (for community) are crucial for building a momentum that can lead to successful CBTH process.